



Volume 1 · Issue 1 · 2026 pp.56-63

Artificial Intelligence Agents, Capital, and Symbolic Violence: Toward a Field Theory of AI in the Social Sciences

Carlos F. De Angelis^{1,*}¹ Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires (UBA), Buenos Aires, Argentina* Corresponding author: cfdeangelis@gmail.com

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received: 09-07-2026

Received in revised form: 04-08-2026

Accepted: 12-08-2026

Available online: 13-08-2026

Keywords:

Artificial Intelligence

Cultural Capital

Field Theory

Habitus

Pierre Bourdieu

Symbolic Violence

ABSTRACT

AI agents intervene in decisions about work, schooling, credit and political communication, and they do so without appearing as participants at all. This article reads them through Pierre Bourdieu's conceptual apparatus. The argument is that these systems redistribute capital across the fields where they operate, and that they draw their authority from the very procedure that keeps their classificatory principle out of reach. Three lines of analysis are developed: AI agents as a form of institutionalized cultural capital that conceals its social origin; the uneven restructuring of the educational, financial, and political fields; and the technical habitus of developers as a source of symbolic violence. The article closes with a research program organized around the notion of the field theory of AI.

1. INTRODUCTION

Machine learning systems moved out of the laboratory in less than a decade. They now mediate hiring, credit allocation, content circulation, academic assessment, and the drafting of institutional documents. Technical accounts of that shift explain how the systems work and say little about the conditions under which they are produced. The normative literature on AI ethics states which principles should govern them and rarely asks who holds the power to formulate and enforce those principles. What is missing is a sociology of the social conditions of production, circulation, and effect of these systems [1, 2].

The question pursued here is narrower than the diagnosis just given. It asks how AI agents operate on preexisting structures of social inequality. Bourdieu's theory of fields, capital, habitus, and symbolic violence is well suited to that question, because it was built to hold together objective structures and the dispositions of the agents who occupy them [3]. Bourdieu himself put the technological case bluntly when he observed that to possess the machines, an owner needs only economic capital.

Genetic structuralism has been applied to education, art, science, the economy and the legal field [4, 5, 6, 7]. Its extension to algorithmic systems is more recent and remains fragmentary. The reading offered here is systematic in one specific sense: it treats field, capital, habitus, and symbolic violence as a single analytical set rather than borrowing one concept at a time, which is what most of the available literature does [8, 9].

AI agents are not neutral instruments. They redistribute capital in the fields where they are deployed, and they usually do so in favor of agents who already hold the dominant forms of it. Like other cultural products, they conceal their own social origins and present the outcome of a specific field logic as an objective and universal result. "Every established order tends to produce the naturalization of its own arbitrariness" [10]. Transformed and disguised forms of economic capital produce their particular effects precisely because they hide the fact that economic capital lies at their root.

2. FIELDS, CAPITAL AND HABITUS

Four concepts organize the analysis. A field is a structured social space of positions, defined by Bourdieu and Wacquant as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions [11, p. 97]. Each field has its own rules, its own relevant forms of capital and its own internal hierarchies. Positions are defined by the determinations they impose on their occupants, by their present and potential situation in the distribution of the species of power at stake, and by their objective relation to other positions. What counts as a valuable resource in the scientific field has little to do with what is valued in the economic or the artistic field. Structural homologies between fields nevertheless allow one form of capital to be converted into another, though never at a symmetrical or automatic rate.

Capital in Bourdieu's formulation is not reducible to its economic form. It also has cultural, social and symbolic dimensions. Cultural capital exists in three states: embodied, as durable dispositions of body and mind; objectified, as cultural goods such as books, instruments and machines; and institutionalized, as credentials that grant official recognition to competences [3]. That threefold distinction does most of the work in the next section.

Habitus designates the system of durable and transposable dispositions that agents acquire along their social trajectory, and that organizes their perceptions, their judgments, and their practices. These are not conscious rules. They are incorporated schemes operating below the level of deliberate calculation [12]. Bourdieu describes habitus as structured, since it is the product of the social conditions that generated it, and as structuring, since it generates practices that tend to reproduce those same conditions. That double condition makes it a mechanism of social reproduction, and it is what allows the analysis to move from the composition of development teams to the categories inscribed in their systems.

Symbolic violence, in turn, names the imposition of systems of meaning that present themselves as legitimate and natural while concealing the relations of force that sustain them. Its efficacy is paradoxical. It operates with the complicity of those who undergo it, who perceive it as fair or inevitable, and Bourdieu characterizes it as a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims [13].

Bourdieu's own work on codification supports the argument developed in the fifth section. Codification, in his account, is the operation that turns practical schemes into explicit and formalized rules, and it produces a specific gain: whatever is codified acquires the appearance of necessity [14]. Harker and May later compared that account with Bernstein's notion of code and showed where the two traditions diverge on how far formalization can go without destroying practical mastery [8]. Algorithmic codification radicalizes the problem, because the formalized rule becomes inaccessible to the agents it governs.

3. ANTECEDENTS

Applications of Bourdieu to technology and digital media have been uneven. Hargittai shifted the terms of the digital divide debate at the start of the present century by moving the problem from access to skill, and her survey of online competences showed that formal access predicts very little on its own [15]. Ragnedda and Muschert then treated the divide as a mechanism reproducing preexisting inequalities rather than as an autonomous technological phenomenon [16].

Work on algorithmic systems has properly documented discriminatory effects on minorities and on populations dependent on public services. Eubanks traced how automated eligibility systems penalize those who already depend on the state, and Pasquale described the structural opacity of financial and search algorithms [17, 18]. Avnoon and Eyal argue something different and more useful for the present argument: opacity is not an inherent property of algorithms but a social construction, elaborated by machine learning experts as an epistemic virtue rather than a defect, in the course of struggles to delimit and legitimate their form of expertise against competitors [19]. The articulation with the notion of field and with strategies of professional distinction is direct. Romele and Rodighiero have said that the notion of digital habitus is rather related to a different perspective that they call Bourdieu inside the digital [20].

Burrell distinguishes three forms of opacity: deliberate corporate secrecy, the technical illiteracy of users, and the inscrutability of machine learning systems, which not even their designers can fully explain [21]. Only the third form is technical in origin. The first two are effects of a distribution of competences, and they map onto the Bourdieusian problem of misrecognition. Bucher comes close to the problem in her analysis of algorithmic power, though she privileges the phenomenology of visibility, that is, how it feels to be seen or made invisible by a platform, over the economy of capital [22]. The gap lies there. It runs between the empirical critique of algorithmic effects and a general theory of capital and field. Read as fields, platforms produce effects of symbolic domination in which the withdrawal of the classificatory criterion is not a defect but a condition of the authority they exercise [23]. A system obtains recognition of

legitimacy in the exact measure to which its principles of division remain beyond the scrutiny of those it classifies. That reproduces the structure Bourdieu and Passeron described for any imposition of meanings that conceals the relations of force sustaining it [5].

4. AI AGENTS AS INSTITUTIONALIZED CULTURAL CAPITAL

Machine learning models are trained on datasets that never represent the social world neutrally. Selecting the training data, defining the classification categories, choosing the performance metrics and fixing the optimization targets: each step carries normative assumptions about what is relevant, what is correct and what is desirable [24]. The people who take those decisions are drawn from a narrow social range. West, Whittaker and Crawford reported that women held around 15 percent of AI research staff positions at Facebook and 10 percent at Google, and that black workers accounted for between 2.5 and 4 percent of the workforce at the largest firms in the sector [25].

Neural architectures add a second layer to the problem. The model organizes information in ways its own designers cannot reconstruct, and then delivers a verdict. Once in use, AI agents present their outputs as objective and universal, with no particular standpoint behind them. Bourdieu called that operation symbolic alchemy, the conversion of the arbitrary into the natural. Taste, in his account of the mechanism, works as the practical operator of the transmutation of things into distinct and distinctive signs [26].

Credit scoring systems, educational recommendation engines, and automated hiring platforms all produce categories that their users perceive as objective, without access to the criteria behind them. The homology with institutionalized cultural capital is close. A degree from a prestigious institution converts the embodied cultural capital of its holder into a credential recognized by society at large; a model trained on the practices of one field converts the logic of that field into criteria that appear objective when applied elsewhere. One difference matters. The degree is attributed to a named individual whose trajectory can be examined; the curriculum is public, and the examination is auditable. The model anonymizes the entire classificatory operation and withdraws it from public scrutiny.

Institutional opacity is not an invention of automated decision-making. Bourdieu and Passeron already described the school as an agency of selection, elimination, and concealment of elimination under selection [5]. School is an institution whose verdicts acquire their force from the fact that the criteria producing them remain withdrawn from those they classify. The examination converts a social distribution into a technical judgment, and the technical form of the judgment is what renders its social principle unavailable for contestation. Algorithmic decision systems radicalize this configuration rather than inaugurate it. What changes is the scale, the speed, and the location of the classificatory operation, together with the fact that the principle of division is now inscribed in a procedure its own designers cannot reconstruct in full. What persists is the structure of misrecognition. A verdict is accepted as a description of the classified subject rather than as the product of a field in which the power to classify is itself at stake.

Those who hold the forms of capital a system values, that is, those who resemble the profile built from the training data, are favored. Applicants who depart from the expected profile by class, gender, ethnicity, age bracket, or geographical origin meet obstacles that tend to be read as individual shortcomings rather than as the effect of a system designed from a particular social position [17]. Noble documented how search engines reproduce racial hierarchies under the appearance of technical neutrality [1]. O'Neil examined scoring, hiring, and recidivism models and showed that the problem belongs to no single sector [27].

5. OBJECTIFIED CULTURAL CAPITAL AND THE DESTINY EFFECT

Bourdieu's work on class, future, and probable causality supplies a second mechanism [28]. Classification systems do not merely describe existing social positions. They contribute to producing them, because they orient the expectations of those they classify. When a predictive system assigns a student a low probability of academic success, the prediction shapes the decisions of teachers, counselors, and the student, and those decisions tend to confirm it [17, 29]. Self-fulfilling prophecies are not new. What changes when the agent producing the prophecy is an opaque system is the source of its authority, which no longer rests on the prestige of an institution or a person but on the appearance of technical objectivity.

Objectified cultural capital covers the material dimension. Large language models, computer vision systems and recommendation engines are material objects that carry accumulated cultural labor: the decisions of engineers, data designers and product managers. Like books or scientific instruments, they objectify forms of cultural competence that can be appropriated and put to use, and like them they require specific forms of embodied cultural capital to be used well. The capacity to use an AI system effectively,

to understand its limits and to contest its outputs is unevenly distributed, and it correlates with the educational and technical capital of the user.

6. THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL FIELDS

Deployment reshapes the rules of the game unevenly. In education, finance and politics, the direction of the shift is similar, and the mechanism differs in each case. Adaptive tutoring platforms promise an education adjusted to each student and, with it, a reduction of inequalities of origin. Reich examined a decade of large-scale interventions and found the opposite pattern: differential access to these systems, combined with the unequal capacity of students to exploit them, reproduces and often widens existing gaps [30]. The embodied cultural capital required for effective use is not randomly distributed. It follows the transmission logic Bourdieu and Passeron described in *Reproduction* half a century ago [5]. Households with more cultural capital provide the support that allows children to engage critically with digital tools. Where that capital is scarcer, the relation tends to be passive and dependent, and the benefit smaller.

Automated assessment tools, AI plagiarism detectors and predictive models of academic performance redefine what counts as success and what counts as failure, and they orient teaching practices in directions that are not always justified pedagogically. Their adoption has followed the logic of cost rather than any argument about learning. That is where the economic field penetrates the educational one.

Finance offers the longest record. It incorporated algorithmic systems at scale before other fields did. Credit scoring models based on machine learning draw on an expanding set of variables: payment history, employment trajectory, behavioral patterns on social platforms, characteristics of the applicant's neighborhood. Many of those variables work as proxies for class, ethnicity or gender, and they produce discriminatory effects that are hard to detect technically and questionable legally [18, 27]. The mechanism is the structural homology between the field and the forms of capital it values. Credit history, employment stability, and property ownership function as capital whose possession opens access to further resources, which in turn reinforces the initial position.

Fourcade and Healy named this process the formation of classification situations, a term closer to the sociological vocabulary than O'Neil's [31]. Both point to the same phenomenon and part company on where the mechanism sits. Fourcade and Healy locate it in the classificatory operation and its anchoring in prior social structures; O'Neil locates it in the mathematical model, which becomes a weapon of math destruction when it encodes social bias under the appearance of quantitative rigor. AI systems do not invent this logic. They encode it, automate it, and lend it an appearance of objectivity that makes it harder to contest.

The political field concentrates the effects with the widest reach for democratic institutions. Microtargeting, content moderation algorithms, and language models able to generate persuasive political material at scale have changed the conditions of competition [32]. Tufekci warned early that the capacity to identify and address specific segments of the electorate confers an advantage on those with the economic capital to fund such campaigns and the technical and organizational capital to run them [33]. Kreiss showed the same asymmetry from an institutional angle: the infrastructure of electoral data concentrates analytical resources in a small number of consultancies with privileged access to technological capital [34].

The resulting advantage is qualitative before it is quantitative. Reaching more voters matters less than the ability to build differentiated narratives for distinct segments and to adapt the presentation of one's own political position to the fears and predispositions of each group [2]. Parties and candidates with fewer resources are left at a structural disadvantage, and that disadvantage tends to widen asymmetries already present in the field. Political competition shifts from the public discussion of ideas toward the private management of data infrastructures. What is affected at the root are the conditions of possibility of democratic deliberation.

7. THE TECHNICAL HABITUS OF DEVELOPERS AND SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

The figures cited above describe a field of production dominated by a small set of institutions and by individuals with a narrow sociodemographic profile. Homogeneity of that order has consequences. It shapes the habitus formed in the field, and with it the dispositions that guide design work.

Broussard describes a set of recurrent dispositions from inside the technical culture she was trained in: treating social problems as technical problems solvable through optimization, preferring quantitative data over situated forms of knowledge, taking scalability as a criterion of value, and leaving the social conditions of production out of the frame [35]. These are not individual choices. They are the outcome of a

long socialization that runs through particular educational institutions, specific organizational cultures, and relatively closed professional networks.

The mechanism of symbolic violence follows from there. Systems produced by agents with a particular technical habitus incorporate the categories of perception and the schemes of classification of that habitus. Deployed in heterogeneous social contexts, they impose those categories as objective criteria. Those classified cannot recognize them as the product of a particular social standpoint. The appearance of technical objectivity replaces personal or institutional authority as the source of legitimacy, and that substitution is where the efficacy of the mechanism lies.

Recidivism risk assessment offers the clearest case. These systems assign risk scores from variables such as neighborhood of residence, educational level, and family history. Angwin, Larson, Mattu, and Kirchner found that black defendants were almost twice as likely as white defendants to be misclassified as high risk, while white defendants were more often misclassified as low risk despite comparable records [36]. From a Bourdieusian standpoint, the empirical bias is not the decisive point. What matters is that the bias arrives dressed in technical and scientific authority, which makes it difficult for those affected to contest and lends legitimacy to the judicial decisions that rely on it.

8. THE EPISTEMIC DIMENSION

Automatic classification systems distribute positions and resources, and they also define what counts as valid knowledge, which evidence is relevant, and which forms of reasoning are legitimate. They help structure what can be thought and said in particular contexts. The effects reach beyond individual classifications, into the collective categories through which societies understand themselves. This connects with what Bourdieu called *doxa*, the set of unquestioned presuppositions that form the horizon of the obvious in a given field [12]. The normalization of AI in institutional decision-making installs one proposition as *doxic*: that quantification and algorithmic prediction are superior forms of knowledge. Contextualized expert judgment, situated knowledge, and forms of practical reasoning that resist formalization are displaced [35]. The displacement is uneven. It falls hardest on agents already in subordinate positions, whose knowledge these systems undervalue. The academic field furnishes an example close at hand, since citation metrics and journal rankings now operate as the practical criterion of what counts as valid thought.

Societies have delegated a large part of their capacity for codification to these systems. The delegation was quiet, and it proceeded without public deliberation.

Codification names the capacity to translate judgments, values, and social categories into computationally operable formats that can be applied automatically and at scale. The capacity is old. Laws codify norms of conduct, statistical classifications codify social categories, and bureaucratic procedures codify criteria of inclusion. What distinguishes AI systems is the scale, speed, and opacity of the codification they perform, together with their capacity to learn and modify their own criteria from feedback data. Following Bourdieu, what codification gains in each case is the appearance of necessity; what algorithmic codification adds is that the codified rule becomes unavailable to those it governs [14].

Three consequences follow. The power to classify concentrates in the hands of those who produce and control these systems, which narrows the plurality of perspectives usually involved in determining legitimate social categories. The resulting systems acquire an authority derived from their technical appearance rather than from any process of democratic legitimation, and that authority withdraws them from public scrutiny. And lock-in effects appear: once codified categories are in use, institutional inertia and transition costs make them difficult to modify even after their unjust effects are documented [18].

Katzenbach and Ulbricht proposed the notion of algorithmic governance to describe how technical infrastructures take on coordination functions that previously belonged to deliberative institutions [37]. The political economy of the delegation deserves equal attention. Which systems get developed, where they are deployed, and by which criteria they are designed: in practice, these decisions belong to private firms whose optimization logics need not coincide with the interests of those affected. That asymmetry expresses the power structure of the technological field, where economic and technical capital are concentrated to an unusual degree.

The state, which in Bourdieu's account works as a meta-field regulating the rules of subordinate fields, tends to appear here in a displaced position and dependent on the large firms of the sector. Its regulatory capacity is limited accordingly [2].

A temporal asymmetry compounds the problem. Conventional bureaucratic procedures can be revised: legal codes exist as texts, written examinations can be reread, administrative decisions can be appealed on the record. Machine learning models operate on historical data that carry the inequities of the past forward.

The automatic reproduction of social history naturalizes inequality, presenting it as a reflection of objective differences between the individuals classified rather than as the outcome of contingent social structures.

Governing those agents as they enter workplaces and public institutions requires confronting both overt and covert challenges to justice and to the future of work [38]. Complementary evidence on how artificial intelligence redistributes employee performance in the information-technology sector makes the same capital logic visible at the level of the firm [39].

9. A FIELD THEORY OF AI AS A RESEARCH PROGRAM

What follows is a theory of the social processes organized around the production, circulation and effects of AI systems, and not a theory of technology. Its object is relational. It covers those who produce these systems, those who deploy them, those who use them and those who end up classified by them. That framing follows the Bourdieusian program of a social science able to examine objective field structures and the subjective structures formed within them at the same time.

The program has four components. The first is an analysis of the field of AI production: its institutions, the positions defined within it, the forms of capital it values, the struggles over criteria of excellence, and its relations with the economic field. That includes the social trajectories of those in dominant positions and the habitus formed in the main training centers [25].

The second concerns the transfer of field logics through AI systems. A model trained in finance and deployed in education, or one developed in a scientific setting and applied in the courts, carries a logic that may produce unanticipated effects. Studying that transfer requires attention to the institutional conditions of reception and to the resistances and adaptations arising in the receiving field, not only to the technical properties of the system.

The third addresses effects on the distribution of capital in the fields where these systems operate. Mixed methods are needed here: quantitative analysis, ethnographic work, interviews with agents in different positions. Existing research has documented such effects in particular settings. Comparative frameworks able to identify patterns across cases remain scarce.

The fourth is the analysis of struggles over what AI systems may and should do in each field. Technology firms, state regulators, civil society organizations, affected communities and epistemic communities from several disciplines participate with unequal resources. Treating these as field struggles explains why certain regulatory or critical approaches prevail while others are marginalized, and how the coalitions and compromises that shape emerging normative frameworks are formed.

Science and technology studies offer the closest complement. Akrich developed the notion of the technical script, the imagined users and expected uses inscribed in artifacts during design, which is compatible with technical habitus while placing the accent on the object rather than on the agent producing it [40]. Critical political economy of platforms examines the accumulation logics of platform capitalism and their effects on labor, privacy, and data sovereignty; its contribution is macroeconomic, centered on business models [41]. Research on algorithmic fairness has developed technical instruments for identifying and mitigating bias, and its concern is corrective, aimed at adjusting the system from within [42]. A Bourdieusian framework adds what that approach cannot supply on its own: an account of bias as an expression of social structures rather than as an isolated technical error.

On the theoretical side, this reading addresses two limitations of the dominant approaches. Technical and instrumental accounts treat bias and discrimination as correctable defects of systems presumed neutral, without asking about the social conditions that produce those defects. Normative approaches in AI ethics formulate desirable principles such as transparency, accountability and non-discrimination without examining the power structures that determine who can formulate and implement them. A field analysis articulates objective structures with the habitus and practices of agents, and treats the conditions of production and legitimation as part of the object rather than as context.

None of this implies structural determinism or a catastrophist view of AI. The point of identifying field structures is to locate the points of tension where struggles over the rules are possible, and where subordinate agents may accumulate enough capital to contest the dominant categories.

Three practical orientations follow, and they are not equivalent in weight. The most demanding is institutional: states and civil society organizations need technical and legal capital, not only budget, to take part in the struggles over the rules of the technological field on something closer to equal terms. Specialized regulatory bodies, independent research on the effects of deployed systems and legal support for affected communities are instruments of that kind. Transparency in production comes second, and it is a necessary condition rather than a sufficient one: unless design criteria, training data and optimization logics are open to scrutiny, those classified cannot contest outcomes and regulators cannot supervise.

Diversity in production teams comes third, and only counts if it modifies the criteria of value of the field itself. Formal inclusion of individuals from underrepresented groups without change in organizational culture leaves the collective habitus intact.

10. CONCLUSION

Reading AI agents with Bourdieu's conceptual apparatus yields three results. These systems redistribute capital in the fields where they operate, and they concentrate the power to classify. Their authority derives from the withdrawal of their classificatory principle, which converts an arbitrary division into a technical judgment. And the habitus of the field of production is inscribed in the systems themselves, which is what makes the resulting imposition a case of symbolic violence rather than of ordinary error.

The delegation of codification carries the widest consequences. It concentrates the power of classification, grants technical legitimacy to categories that remain arbitrary, and automatically reproduces past inequities. Understanding those mechanisms is a condition for designing institutional practices able to counter their effects, though not a sufficient one.

Two limitations bear on what has been argued. The level of abstraction does not substitute for detailed empirical analysis of specific cases, and the proposition that most needs testing is the one about transfer of field logics. A tractable design would follow a single scoring system from the financial field into the educational one, with access to its design criteria and to reclassification rates before and after deployment. The second limitation is internal to the framework: Bourdieu's account of agency and of the possibilities of social transformation that do not derive from the internal logic of fields is thin, and this article inherits that thinness rather than resolving it.

REFERENCES

- [1] Noble, S. (2018). *Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism*. New York University Press.
- [2] Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power*. PublicAffairs.
- [3] Bourdieu, P. (1986b). The forms of capital. In *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241–258). Greenwood Press.
- [4] Bourdieu, P. (1996). *The rules of art: Genesis and structure of the literary field*. Stanford University Press.
- [5] Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1977). *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. SAGE.
- [6] Kretschmann, A. (2025). On Pierre Bourdieu's legal thought: Toward a classic of socio-legal studies. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 21(1), 17–34. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-062124-122138>
- [7] Verwiebe, R., & Hagemann, S. (2025). Bourdieu revisited: New forms of digital capital – emergence, reproduction, inequality of distribution. *Information, Communication & Society*, 28(11), 1861–1883. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2024.2358170>
- [8] Harker, R., & May, S. A. (1993). Code and habitus: Comparing the accounts of Bernstein and Bourdieu. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 14(2), 169–178. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0142569930140204>
- [9] Romele, A. (2023). *Digital habitus: A critique of the imaginaries of artificial intelligence* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003400479>
- [10] Bourdieu, P. (1977a). *Outline of a theory of practice*. Cambridge University Press.
- [11] Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. University of Chicago Press.
- [12] Bourdieu, P. (1977b). *Outline of a theory of practice*. Cambridge University Press.
- [13] Bourdieu, P. (2001). *Masculine domination*. Polity Press.
- [14] Bourdieu, P. (1986a). Habitus, code et codification. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 64(1), 40–44. <https://doi.org/10.3406/arss.1986.2335>
- [15] Hargittai, E. (2002). Second-level digital divide: Differences in people's online skills. *First Monday*, 7(4). <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v7i4.942>
- [16] Ragnedda, M., & Muschert, G. W. (2013). *The digital divide: The internet and social inequality in international perspective*. Routledge.
- [17] Eubanks, V. (2018). *Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and punish the poor*. St. Martin's Press.
- [18] Pasquale, F. (2015). *The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money and information*. Harvard University Press.

- [19] Avnoon, N., & Eyal, G. (2026). It's not a bug, it's a feature: How AI experts and data scientists account for the opacity of algorithms. *Social Studies of Science*, 56(1), 28–52. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03063127251364509>
- [20] Romele, A., & Rodighiero, D. (2020). *Digital habitus or personalization without personality*. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3950031>
- [21] Burrell, J. (2016). How the machine 'thinks': Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms. *Big Data & Society*, 3(1), 2053951715622512. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715622512>
- [22] Bucher, T. (2018). *If...then: Algorithmic power and politics*. Oxford University Press.
- [23] De Angelis, C. F. (2026). *The rise of algorithmic society: History, power and subjectivity in digital capitalism*. Generis Publishing.
- [24] Crawford, K. (2021). *Atlas of AI: Power, politics, and the planetary costs of artificial intelligence*. Yale University Press.
- [25] West, S. M., Whittaker, M., & Crawford, K. (2019). *Discriminating systems: Gender, race and power in AI*. AI Now Institute.
- [26] Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. Harvard University Press.
- [27] O'Neil, C. (2016). *Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and threatens democracy*. Crown.
- [28] Bourdieu, P. (1974). Avenir de classe et causalité du probable. *Revue française de sociologie*, 15(1), 3–42. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3320261>
- [29] Martin, K., & Waldman, A. (2023). Are algorithmic decisions legitimate? The effect of process and outcomes on perceptions of legitimacy of AI decisions. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 183(3), 653–670. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-05032-7>
- [30] Reich, J. (2020). *Failure to disrupt: Why technology alone can't transform education*. Harvard University Press.
- [31] Fourcade, M., & Healy, K. (2013). Classification situations: Life-chances in the neoliberal era. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 38(8), 559–572. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2013.11.002>
- [32] Persily, N., & Tucker, J. A. (2020). *Social media and democracy: The state of the field, prospects for reform*. Cambridge University Press.
- [33] Tufekci, Z. (2014). Engineering the public: Big data, surveillance and computational politics. *First Monday*, 19(7). <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v19i7.4901>
- [34] Kreiss, D. (2016). *Prototype politics: Technology-intensive campaigning and the data of democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- [35] Broussard, M. (2018). *Artificial unintelligence: How computers misunderstand the world*. MIT Press.
- [36] Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., & Kirchner, L. (2016). *Machine bias: There's software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it's biased against blacks*. ProPublica.
- [37] Katzenbach, C., & Ulbricht, L. (2019). Algorithmic governance. *Internet Policy Review*, 8(4). <https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.4.1424>
- [38] Pandey, J. K., & Kumar, R. (2025). Governing the algorithmic agent: Confronting overt and covert challenges to justice and the future of work. *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*, 8(4), 1974–1984. <https://doi.org/10.1000/IJLMH.1110648>
- [39] Lalitha Kumari, P., & Pandey, J. K. (2023). Impact of artificial intelligence on employees' performance in information technology sector. *AIP Conference Proceedings*, 2587, 020004. <https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0150403>
- [40] Akrich, M. (1992). The de-scription of technical objects. In W. E. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), *Shaping technology/building society: Studies in sociotechnical change* (pp. 205–224). MIT Press.
- [41] Srnicek, N. (2017). *Platform capitalism*. Polity Press.
- [42] Barocas, S., Hardt, M., & Narayanan, A. (2019). *Fairness and machine learning: Limitations and opportunities*. fairmlbook.org.