The BWC in Today's Multipolar World

Authors

Keywords:

Structural Realism, Biological Weapons Convention, Multipolarity, Security Dilemma, Dual-Use Technology, Great-Power Rivalry

Abstract

People often point to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a massive success for international disarmament. The reality, however, is that the BWC’s framework is practically hollow. This is a major problem right now because international relations have become so complicated. We’re living in a world that is somehow unipolar, multipolar, and chaotic all at once, and the balance of power keeps shifting across different domains. This article shows a structural realist Critique of the convention within the context of an emerging chaotic multipolar world Order. As dual-use biotechnology becomes cheaper and easier to conceal since great power rivalries intensified, the lack of a hard verification mechanism becomes a major strategic liability for the treaty. And in an anarchic international system, states operate on a baseline of mistrust, creating a classic security dilemma because the states cannot independently verify the biological research of rival nations. Thus, fear and uncertainty make clandestine defection a rational strategy for survival.
The paper also argues that without a single hegemon who is willing to enforce a rigorous inspection regime in order to deter cheating, the notion of collective security in the biological sector remains a dangerous illusion. By analysing the different sections of cutting-edge technology in life science and shifting geopolitical alignment, the study elucidates how technological opacity worsens the classic security dilemma and how institutions and multilateral agreements cannot override the basic logic of power politics. When push comes to shove, states will discard toothless treaties and rely strictly on their own unilateral defence.

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Published

05-08-2026

How to Cite

The BWC in Today’s Multipolar World. (2026). Journal of Multidisciplinary Sciences, Arts and Humanities, 1(1), 1-5. https://ijpress.com/jmsah/article/view/5

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